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Abstract 
 
In a war environment, in an atmosphere of increased national passion, the Western Balkans area obviously 
sidestepped the wave of wartime propaganda, media preparation and support and justification of the war. 
However, in Montenegro itself were manifested some characteristics, since on the territory of the republic, 
except for an occasional incident situation, there was no real armed conflict. The armed conflicts in southern 
Herzegovina, Bosnia, Dubrovnik, mobilized soldiers, induced psychosis in the public opinion of xenophobia 
and nationalism of all kinds was accompanied by an adequate and aggressive propaganda. 
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THE MEDIA AND THE POLITICAL PROPAGANDA 
 
There are many definitions of the political propaganda term in dependence of the 
authors and attitude towards political persuasion. Organized political persuasion is called 
political propaganda. Practically there is no human activity which is not affected by 
propaganda and very different concepts are implied under this name. Because of this, it is 
not unusual that in the determination of the term propaganda, there appear as many 
definitions as there are authors who confirm that definition. This term is primarily burdened 
with ideological, but also with emotional attitude, which in the understanding of its essence 
have individuals, as well as social groups. Propaganda is primarily a value-neutral term, 
while a political activity that is not due to any propaganda has a certain target. For this 
occasion and topic, the following definition seems to be appropriate: “Political propaganda 
is a planned and organized activity on the creation, presentation, expansion of political 
content, attracting the people and securing their support for a particular political content 
and their stakeholders.” (Slavujevic 2005, 12).  
The propaganda is the creation and dissemination of ideas and attitudes in order to 
create readiness for a particular course of action. Propaganda represents every aspect of 
deliberate and organized activities which are carried out with the aim of influence on the 
views, opinions or feelings of the public, groups or individuals, with intention to obtain 
ideas, views and program of a social and political organization which conducts this activity. 
This term originates from the Latin propagare (spreading, reproduction, multiplication). 
Propaganda is therefore the kind of communication that is performed to convince message 
recipients. The ultimate goal of political propaganda is to directly or indirectly induce 
individuals to participate in political activities of a certain political party, in the manner and 
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to the extent determined by the political subject alone. Propaganda primarily affects 
people's attitudes, emphasizing in this way: that attitudes are kind of predisposition for 
behavior or a latent structure which directs behavior in situations where the individual is 
confronted with the object attitude (Šiber 1998, 293). With the propaganda influence, the 
most common effects are achievements in the field of strengthening positions, the effect of 
mobilization of the already formed attitudes, as well as crystallization and the formation of 
a new attitude. Political propaganda is therefore a deliberate and planned (organized) 
activity that has the task of overturning or, keeping certain political attitudes of individuals, 
social groups or society as a whole. 
The goal of propaganda is to influence the way of thinking and behavior of people. 
Propaganda produces certain socio-psychological consequences and tends to penetrate to 
the deepest layers of the human psyche and to act on the segments which most frequently 
cannot be rationally controlled. In this sense, Bolshevik Rjzanov says: “they say that the 
English Parliament can do anything except change a man into a woman. Our Central 
Committee is far more powerful. He changed more than one man indifferent to the 
revolution into the old woman, whose number is increasing day by day.” (Roberts 2002, 
469). This paper is based on the analysis of printed and electronic media from the early 90-
ies of XX century. In that time, in Montenegro existed only one daily state-run newspaper 
“Pobjeda”. 
 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM AND 
THE ENTRANCE IN RAW PLURALISM 
 
One of the causes of conflicts and wars in the former Yugoslavia lies in the fact 
that nationalists or in most cases communists who manipulated nationalism managed to 
impose the cult of the past, to lead the peoples to turn to national history, to revive old 
hostilities and continue the ancient wars. In many cases indeed, what is meant here are the 
efforts to find and revive ties from the past, to establish the continuity of certain ideas and 
projects, from today's perspective and modern goals. It may be noted that yesterday's 
communists, supporters of the idea of Yugoslavia, brotherhood and unity, recognized in the 
previously repressed nationalism new “power” and the field to win or maintain power. It is 
evident that for years, “Tito's time, '' Tito's paths of freedom,” the idea of brotherhood and 
unity, non-alignment and etc., constituted a kind of political bequeathing and a strong 
cohesive factor that is induced by daily propaganda in the Yugoslav public. With 
weakening of Tito's cult and his ideas, clearly was imposed a need for a new 'magnet for 
the masses “, now in the form of several political centers, which tried to form a critical 
homogenized mass that is strong enough to preserve or arrive to power by promoting ethno- 
nationalism. Statement by former high officials from Kosovo Fadil Hoxha (1986):  
There are individual cases of rape in Kosovo. I think that the private cafes in 
Kosovo should be allowed to bring, to recruit women from other parts of 
Yugoslavia. These individuals who rape women of other nationalities could 
mistreat to such places. Albanian women do not allow it, but Serb and others 
would, so why they do not allow it (...) had a negative effect and resonance 
in the former Yugoslav public. (Popov 2002, 210).  
 
This statement launched an avalanche of protest gatherings in Kosovo, it was the 
subject of a large number of newspaper articles, and represented “to add fuel to the fire” to 
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the already boiling and tense atmosphere of interethnic intolerance. After the first 
parliamentary elections in Montenegro, in 1990, there was a press conference by an 
opposition party. It was a conference of the National Party, which from the outset 
established itself as a national party whose priority was to fight for the Serbian’s and 
Orthodoxy, and in the next decade will be a serious factor in the Montenegrin political 
pluralism. The National Party pointed out request “to declare Christmas as a public holiday, 
and Savindan (St. Sava) and St. Vitus school holidays.” (Andrijašević 1999, 3). A similar 
note was worn by forward-looking statements and comments on the visit of the delegation 
of the Order of the Knights of Malta to Montenegro. Receiving representatives of the 
Knights of Malta by the authorities in Montenegro N. Kilibarda rated very negatively. 
Kilibarda said that the organization of the Order of Malta is the right hand of Vatican and 
his predecessor: “Acceptance of the representatives of the Maltese knights coincides with 
the initiative to introduce Italian in the Montenegrin schools. Recalls that the Italian was 
not taught in Montenegro even in the time of King Nikola, who had friendly ties with 
Italy.” (Kilibarda 1994, 2). These and similar ideas and statements were in the function of 
acquiring certain target groups and segmentation of messages according to ethnic and 
religious affiliation. Also, during the first years of the multiparty system, an opposition 
newspaper in Montenegro was accused of spreading anti-Semitism. In the article “Dance of 
the Vampires” published in the “Information Bulletin” of the Municipal Board of the 
Serbian National Renewal of Bijelo Polje, set out accusations against the Jews: 
The Jews are the cause and perpetrators of all the evils of this world - all the 
evil comes from them. These murderers, thieves, fraudsters, vagrants - 
Jewish spawn in Europe today is the biggest ally of the Mohammedan 
stinking pigs and Protestant sick dogs (which is reflected in the spread of 
religious hatred). This will not end their crimes. Today, they are next to 
Turkey and Iran, the main supplier of the Green Berets paramilitary groups 
in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina… For Jews there is not enough crude 
punishment, sacred Spanish Inquisition was too lenient for them. (Serbian 
National Renewal 1994, 2). 
 
In an atmosphere of a decline of previous social values, when all options were 
open and everything is allowed, the newly-formed political entities had to learn the 
multiparty system and political dialogue. Vice-President of the Parliament of Montenegro 
S. Bozovic sharply reacted to the words of A. Visnjic, representatives of the Serbian 
Radical Party, warned him that in the Parliament he cannot offend and present severe and 
harsh words at the expense of colleagues. Visnjic was namely, replicating, said that R. 
Rotković (deputy Liberal Alliance) is not Montenegrin, but shores man and cannot defend 
Montenegro. He added also that “Rotković with its appearance more reminds to Muslim old 
man and is not suitable to tell lies”. (Parliament of Montenegro, 13). In March 1991, 
members of the Serbian police station in Pakrac took the station and proclaimed it as 
Serbian station, but they withdrew in front of Croatian anti-terrorist police unit of about 200 
members. Belgrade journalist M. Milosevic gives media fabrication of that event: “special 
reporters of RTV Montenegro reported that at least 40 people were killed in the town of 
Pakrac in Croatia. Unofficially, it is learned that there are 40 dead and dozens wounded. 
Fear of stray bullets. Serb population seeking refuge in refugee camps. JNA engaged.” 
(Special reporters of RTV Montenegro 1991, 1). Radio Belgrade accepted the report, but 
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noted the number of six dead. TV Novi Sad reported eight dead; a Belgrade TV recorded an 
Orthodox priest among the dead. Presidency of Yugoslavia finally appeared with official 
notice announcing that no one was killed in Pakrac. (Kurspahić 2003, 63). The statement of 
the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia said that until then there were no 
human casualties, but one seriously wounded, along with, two members of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs slightly wounded. In October 1991, after a media preparation and incident 
on the Montenegrin-Croatian border, the Yugoslav People's army, according to official 
media, “passed from passive defense into offensive action.” As then specified by 
“Pobjeda”, “it started to beat Ustasha positions with artillery”. The old rule says that in a 
war, the first to starve is the truth. Thus, immediately after the beginning of the occupation 
of Dubrovnik, its mayor P. Poljanić told on 12 October 1991 in front of TV cameras that 
around 15.000 shells hit the city. That news went around and alarmed the world. The 
shelling of Dubrovnik attracted much of the world public, especially since the city was 
under protection.  It turns out that Adolph Hitler would have been under the protection of 
UNESCO if he had hidden in Dubrovnik”. (Matija Beckovic 1991, 1). The only daily 
newspaper in the republic and state gazette, the “Pobjeda”, encouraged patriotism in a 
negative context and in animosity wrote about those who did not support the war for 
Dubrovnik. In December 1991, “Pobjeda” quoted a statement by Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, 
who enthusiastically talked about the heroic feats of Montenegrins on the Dubrovnik front, 
incidentally threatening internal traitors in Montenegro:  
Give my regards to the heroic brothers Montenegrins, saying that Dubrovnik 
has to be ours or godly! In the summer I am coming to Dubrovnik to hear 
the fiddle, and and afterwards, me and my army are going to take back 
Skadar! And say to those Ustasha Jevrem Brkovic and Slavko Perovic that I 
will, when I finish the outside enemy, I will finish their father and mother - 
said Arkan. 
 
The members of other religions and nationalities have contributed to the 
exacerbation of the complex political situation, primarily induced with Serbo-Croatian 
tensions and conflicts. They held cultural and religious events in Montenegro to spread hate 
speech and thereby contributed to the deepening of the atmosphere of mistrust, extremely 
suitable for various forms of manipulation and propaganda:  
Clumsy Prince Lazar in 1389 ran with his counterparts in front of a powerful 
empire, which had smashed him. Then, from that was created fake epic upon 
which generations have built their inferior culture. And now they are 
complaining how is supposedly good to the entire Yugoslav people, except 
to them. How will be good to them when they have chosen heavenly 
kingdom between earthly and heavenly kingdom. (Rasim Muminović, 9).      
 
No single political leadership of Montenegro was immune to the events at the 
Dubrovnik battlefield. In this context, Milo Djukanovic said: “I have already hated chess 
because of them and their submissiveness to the chessboard (Croatian flag has chessboard 
in the middle) and the young democracy “such as type of ‘Kalashnikov’”. Twelve years 
later (in 2003), Milo Djukanovic called his statement: “absolutely benign” compared to the 
statements that have come from Zagreb and clarified the pretensions towards the Bay of 
Kotor (Pavlovic 2004). 
 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 1, No. 2, 2015 | UDC 327 | ISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies – Bitola at www.e-jlia.com 
            
5 
 
THE HOT ENVIRONMENT – THE OVERFLOW OF MEDIA HATE SPEECH 
 
Regarding the war on the borders of Montenegro and its neighboring area, and the 
fact that it represented small political and economic system for the former Yugoslav 
conditions which is impossible to observe isolated outside the context of economic, and 
political circumstances in the wider area of Yugoslavia, it is necessary to underline the 
propaganda activity in an environment that was overflowing and the territory of 
Montenegro. Political propaganda in the war differed from those of pre-war. The media 
highlighted the stories of victims and culprits at that time, of “them” and “us”, and the 
images were becoming bloodier and crueler. The language itself and the images become 
more emotional in order to wake up the reaction. In these tragic events of the civil war, the 
media of all involved parties raced in hate speech and rising tensions. Propagandists 
implement stereotypes, manipulate emotions, and through myths connect the events from 
the past and the present, in order to convince people that created stories are part of their 
history.  
The best example remains the Battle of Kosovo, manner in which Slobodan 
Milosevic and the emperor Lazar and his fight for the Serbs are combined into one symbol. 
Another myth that marked the 90s is one of the “millennial dream of Croatia”, which once 
again all those who received the message were recalled to the past as well, the struggle for 
independence and vulnerability of one side to the other side. Comments were broadcasted 
with plenty of outrage, and the ruling circles of one or the other side proclaimed even entire 
nations, without excepts as chetniks, ustasha or jihadists, genocidal etc. There were various 
other extremist publications, such as “Dragon of Bosnia” in Tuzla and the weekly 
newspaper “Bosnjak” which called for revenge against the Serbs and to a lesser measure 
against Croats. “Every Muslim should have a Serb to kill him” - wrote Zilhad Ključanin. 
Zenica Board of the Islamic Religious Community printed own instructions to Islamic 
fighters, which was signed by Halil Mehic and Hasan Makić, concluding that the military 
command has to decide what is more useful and of greater interest to do with enemy 
prisoners: to release them, exchange them or liquidate them. Mentioned Ključanin in the 
introduction of “Ljiljan”, published on 23 February 1994, wrote: “a Serb is approaching to 
mankind only when he is dead”. (Kurspahic 2003, 109). And here the opinion of Biljana 
Plavsic about the members of other religions: “Muslims are genetically rotten material 
transferred to Islam. And now, of course, from generation to generation, this gene simply 
condenses. It's getting worse and worse, expressing simplicity, dictates a way of thinking 
and behavior. It is already imbedded in the genes.” (Biljana Plavsic 1993, 1). 
Hate speech used the names and false pretext of naming an opponent or giving 
names which members of other nations consider abusive or ineligible (such as “Shiptars” 
for the Albanians, “Bali”, “mujahedin”, “Turk converts” or “Turks” for Bosnian Muslims, 
“Viennese horseman” for Slovenes, “Serbo-Chetniks”, “Chetniks”, “Byzantines” for the 
Serbs etc.) Broadcasted comments were full of outrage, and the ruling circles of one or 
another side proclaimed even entire nations, without gaps, as chetniks, ustasha or jihadists, 
genocidal, and similar. In the primetime news program TV news broadcasted in 1992 on 
Bosnian Serb television, the editor compared former Muslim territory and read the fate of 
the population of that entity by coffee tasseography. It is unethical behavior of editors who 
began Daily News with the film where they washed the feet in a basin, alluding to the 
backwardness of the Muslim nation, which further deepened the antagonism and hatred 
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toward members of this nation. (Zuber 2005, 35). And in the political discourse in Slovenia 
and Croatia,  the effort to justify the political and military actions that were undertaken 
there was noticeable, as well as the effort to legitimize them as. Supposedly, it is in the 
interest of Europe to withdraw and establish a new border in the former Yugoslavia 
between “western and eastern part, between modest and working west-Catholic tradition 
and violet, Oriental-Byzantine heritage”, as Slovenian Minister of Science Peter Tancig 
quoted. Prejudices such as: “Croats are cunning Latin’s, the Serbs are cunning Byzantines, 
Albanians are aggressive, brash, brutal and insidious, are some of the widely used in 
everyday discourse.” (Trebjesanin 1995, 94).  
In the western media, Milosevic was characterized as butcher of the Balkans, the 
Balkan Hitler, European Saddam Hussein. During the Croatian-Muslim conflict in Bosnia, 
Tudjman was described as an apprentice of the Balkans butcher, overt racists and anti-
Semitist, despicable villain. Tudjman wrote the following in his book, among other things: 
“Genocide is a natural phenomenon (…) God not only allows genocide..,” what looked like 
a continuation to the policy of the Independent Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in the 
Second World War. (Gruden 2004, 27). Broadcast of the secret TV footage about import of 
weapons from Hungary and shot of Martin Spegelj, Croatian Minister of Defense, shocked 
the Yugoslav public and then in response clearly shows how chauvinism feeds the other in 
an atmosphere of growing nationalism and evoking memories from previous wars. Martin 
Spegelj, in a secret recording, among other things said: “We will solve Knin in a manner 
that we will massacre everyone. We have the international recognition and therefore we 
will massacre them ... It will not be a war, but it will be a civil war where there would not 
be mercy to anyone, not even to wife or the children. In the apartment just bombs (...)” 
(Popov 2002, 225). During a break within a session of the Presidency of the Yugoslav 
Alliance of Communist (SKJ), state “Daily news” played footage about the illegal import of 
weapons and arming the police in Croatia. That needed to works propagandistic on the 
present members of the Presidency. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
So, in such a war environment, in an atmosphere of growing national passion, the 
area of Western Balkans, including Montenegro, did not passed over the wave of war 
propaganda, media preparation and support and justification for the war. However, the 
requisite specificity was demonstrated in Montenegro, because on the territory of the 
republic, except for occasional incidental situations, there was no real armed conflict. 
Specificity is also a certain percentage of proponents of the Montenegrin independence who 
gave a special tone to the atmosphere caused by the surrounding wars, with their ideas and 
appearances in the media and political life. Armed conflicts in southern Herzegovina, 
Dubrovnik, Bania area where where soldiers were deployed, induced in public psychosis of 
xenophobia and nationalisms of all kinds, and this been accompanied by an adequate 
propaganda of aggressive war propaganda. The new governments formed after the collapse 
of the former Yugoslavia actually used the media as a weapon that can contribute to 
achieving their short-term and long-term political goals. The interpretation of events, their 
linking with immediate and distant past, creating a unique mythic image of the eternal 
sacrifice of own people, the genocidal character and fickleness and depravity of other 
people - it was a task that is equally valuable carried out not only by many journalists, but 
also by many intellectuals. To do so, each government in the republics tried to dominate the 
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media in their territory, especially television, turning them into instruments of the regime's 
propaganda with the task to “obtain” population for its political ideas and actions. So, in 
such a war environment, in an atmosphere of growing national passion, this area did not 
skip the wave of war propaganda, media preparation and support and justification for the 
war. From a number of reports, studies, articles and testimonies follows that the common 
trait of national political programs in the former Yugoslavia presented from the late eighties 
to the first years of the third millennium, follows that the trait was supported and allowed 
by the media, which became the most loyal servants of the nationalist parties in power in 
the republics. 
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